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CHINA’S ANTISHIP BALLISTIC MISSILE
Developments and Missing Links
Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin

C

hina’s pursuit of an antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) has been called a potential “game changer,” a weapon that could single-handedly shift the strategic balance with the United States. A retired U.S. Navy rear admiral asserted as
early as 2005 that an ASBM capability could represent “the strategic equivalent
of China’s acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964.”1 Whether or not this is accurate,
an effective ASBM capability would undoubtedly constitute a formidable antiaccess weapon against the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific, particularly during a
conflict over Taiwan.2 However, as the Chinese literature demonstrates, it would
mean more than that. Fully operational ASBM capability along with essential
C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) support would be a barometer of China’s greater
military modernization effort, a potential instrument for regional strategic ambitions, and perhaps an important element in tipping the long-term maritime
strategic balance with respect to the United States.
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away requires a wide range of support and information technologies far beyond
just the missile itself. Certainly, the medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) is
the core component of this system, and the technological demands in maneuvering, guidance, and homing to defeat defenses and find its moving target at sea
are formidable. However, an effective ASBM would also require the ability to detect, identify, and track the target using some combination of land, sea, air, and
space-based surveillance assets. Aside from the immediate software and hardware, all of these functions would have to be highly integrated, fast reacting, and
sufficiently flexible to attack the world’s most sophisticated and best defended
naval target in the world today—a U.S. aircraft carrier strike group (CSG).
China’s interest in ASBM capability seems logical on the basis of its perceptions of its strategic environment and as a natural outgrowth of its robust
missile program. Yet at what stage is its development? While Andrew Erickson
and David Yang (earlier in this issue) survey the Chinese literature regarding
the strategic, policy, and doctrinal dimensions of the ASBM system, this article examines the development of several key components of the system and
their operational readiness. It does so on the basis of the literature, supported
by qualitative modeling where direct discussions of the system are particularly
lacking, such as for space-based targeting.4 Finally, the article addresses some of
the implications for the U.S. Navy and the naval strategic balance between the
United States and China.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) rarely discusses openly the development of major new weapon systems, but the ASBM appears to be an exception.
In an annual academic conference sponsored by the Second Artillery Engineering College, the proceedings clearly state that “in order to pierce the armor of a
carrier . . . China is developing a new boost-glide ballistic missile . . . equipped
with terminal guidance systems.”5 This startlingly direct admission reveals
the level of commitment to the program within the military branch primarily developing it. However, the building of such a system should not come as
a surprise. As Erickson and Yang make clear, China’s military appears keenly
interested in an ASBM capability, for a variety of reasons. Most important, the
antiship ballistic missile comports with China’s perception of its security environment and its strategic vulnerabilities vis-à-vis the U.S. military. An ASBM
could afford China a formidable asymmetric weapon against the United States
in the western Pacific and would be particularly relevant to a confl ict over Taiwan. Moreover, an ASBM program is a feasible application for China’s mature
and sophisticated ballistic and cruise missile technological developments.
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THE KILL CHAIN
While the concept of an ASBM system is evident at high-level discussions in the
military, the ability to operationalize what is described as “a system of systems”
involves a series of capabilities that go far beyond just the core missile components.6 A complete ASBM system will require the ability to detect, identify, track,
target, and engage a threat and then perform damage assessment upon it—the
“kill chain.”7 Each of these sensor-to-shooter steps must be executed in a timesensitive manner, since the intended target would be maneuverable—a U.S. aircraft carrier (or carrier strike group, comprising the carrier, its escorts, other
missile-carrying ships, and support and other vessels assigned to its embarked
commander). A complete kill chain entails a wide range of technologies, from
penetration aids on board the missile, space-based and other sensors, data processing and exchange networks, and other infrastructure to achieve a high degree of integration of both the weapon platform and its command and control.8
The relevant literature stresses three technical challenges that would have to
be resolved if China is to achieve an effective and reliable ASBM capability: first,
ensuring that an ASBM can defeat American missile defenses; second, equipping a ballistic-missile weapon system to track and hit a moving target in its
terminal phase; and last, providing accurate, real-time geolocation tracking and
targeting data—particularly using space-based assets—to the missile system
prior to launch.
The Missile’s Mission
There is little doubt that a variant of the Dong Feng 21 (DF-21) missile is the candidate for the ASBM.9 Moreover, much of the work to adapt the DF-21 for such
a mission appears to have been developed in the late 1990s, such as an ablative
shield against aerodynamic heating during reentry, vibration resistance, and optimization of the payload.10 There is also discussion of adding a third stage to
the missile, not only to increase its range but to provide extra maneuverability in
midcourse flight (discussed below).11 The third stage appears to be in development, although several documents suggest that the missile and its maneuvering
capabilities remain in the early research and experimental stages.12
Chinese sources go into detail about various methods of maneuvering during a ballistic missile’s midcourse phase.13 Maneuvering increases the missile’s
terminal target-seeking coverage so as to hit a moving target at sea. However, the
impact of U.S. missile defenses—primarily the sea-based Aegis system equipped
with SM-3, Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and the Kinetic
Energy Interceptor—on the missile’s survivability is also discussed.14 A number
of measures are suggested to defeat them. Altering the missile’s flight path by
employing a wavelike trajectory rather than a traditional parabolic flight path is
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one method.15 In this scenario, the additional third stage of the DF-21 missile,
with its hybrid liquid-solid fuel booster, is ignited several times to effect several
wave patterns in the missile’s midcourse flight (see figure 1). Other methods
include weaving, spiraling, spinning, and gliding—all of which would alter the
traditional parabolic flight path of the ballistic missile and boost the missile’s
penetration capabilities against American missile defenses, which depend heavily on prediction of a missile’s flight trajectory.16
FIGURE 1
WAVE TRAJECTORY

Source: Gu Liangxian, Gong Chunlin, and Wu Wuhua, “Design and Optimization of Wavy Trajectory for Ballistic Missiles.”

Controlled maneuvering in space should not be a “bottleneck technology,”
according to one source, since China has already demonstrated real progress
in “orbital maneuvering and docking” under the Shenzhou program.17 However, other publications suggest that research and experiments involving wave
and gliding trajectories began only in 2003, de novo, and there is no evidence
that China has made breakthroughs in this area.18 Moreover, the academic treatments of these exo-atmospheric maneuvers appear to be largely theoretical in
nature.19 For instance, they do not systematically address the problem of how to
“maintain guidance [for the target] during the whole trajectory,” which other
articles insist is a technical challenge China must overcome.20 In fact, the technical discussion does not directly connect midcourse maneuvering with the
ASBM system, as several general analyses do, suggesting that such linkage is
only conceptual. Also, the omission of alternative, traditional countermeasures
and decoys seems impractical; 21 a number of prominent American specialists
believe that China would likely be able to defeat midcourse interceptors using
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relatively low-tech means.22 The simplest countermeasure of all may be simply
to launch a salvo of missiles; U.S. missile defenses would not likely be able to
destroy them all.23
China has already demonstrated many of the core technologies required for
such a system. While adapting off-the-shelf technologies to an ASBM system
is both logical progression and feasible, the literature appears ambiguous as to
their application to a new environment (penetrating missile defenses) and an
evolved mission (hitting a moving target at sea).
Terminal Guidance and Homing
A second area that has received substantial attention in the technical literature
is the demand for reentry and terminal guidance of the warhead. Opinions on
this point appear to vary considerably more than with other aspects of the system. Some observers are cautious about such a program, seeing the significant
technical hurdles inherent in a complex ASBM system. A key issue according to
most analyses is the speed of the warhead. Reentry into the atmosphere at high
speed (2.2–5 km/sec) would produce a plasma shield, making homing by radar and infrared difficult.24 However, “to control the missile’s speed in order to
switch from midstage guidance [inertial] to terminal stage guidance [homing]
will require an overload that will be difficult to achieve.”25 Aside from the difficulties of controlling the missile’s velocity, a lower terminal speed would make
the warhead more vulnerable to missile defenses.26 Others fear that the range of
maneuverability of the carrier could be sufficient to evade the missile, even with
active homing systems.27 A number of other constraints to developing a reliable
ASBM are also discussed. For instance, can the warhead attack its target at the
desired angle—to pierce the carrier’s armor—given the constraints of the missile’s trajectory after reentry and the requirements of radar and infrared homing?28 Also, can the missile carry sufficient antijamming capabilities?29
Nonetheless, the majority of studies indicate that the technical obstacles are
well within China’s ability to resolve. For example, controlling the speed of the
missile after reentry is difficult but possible. A number of authors suggest a
“pulling up” maneuver at an altitude of between twenty-five and fifty kilometers to level off the ballistic trajectory, positioning the warhead to search for its
target.30 The change in trajectory would also act as a defense-penetration aid.31
As for guiding the missile to its target, a number of studies argue that the speed
and maneuverability of an aircraft carrier are probably too limited to evade an
MRBM in the terminal phase.32 As figure 2, adapted from a Chinese study, illustrates, the “kill radius” (the distance the target could deviate from initial position and still be struck) of a terminally guided ASBM missile that has reduced
its speed to allow for active homing to seek its target is approximately twenty
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kilometers.33 This assumes the missile has accurate prelaunch target coordinates
(discussed later) and that the missile’s flight time (also, the time the carrier has
to maneuver) is limited to roughly fifteen minutes. If the system is relying on
space-based targeting, this is likely an overly optimistic scenario; 34 however, assuming that it is possible, an aircraft carrier could not evade the missile even
if traveling at thirty-five knots. Using guidance in both the midcourse (for instance, millimeter-wave radar) and terminal (radar or infrared) phases could
increase the attack radius to forty kilometers, according to one study.35
FIGURE 2
ASBM KILL RADIUS

Source: Chen Haidong et al., “Study for the Guidance Scheme of Reentry Vehicles Attacking Slowly Moving Targets.”

Another source draws the conclusion—using a different simulation—that
the warhead could have a kill radius of one hundred kilometers once terminal
guidance was engaged.36 In a discussion in Naval and Merchant Ships, Dong Lu
calculates the maximum distance at which the basic radar terminal guidance of
a similar missile system, the retired U.S. Pershing II, could detect a carrier that
had maneuvered for fifteen minutes, given a scanning height for the missile’s
radar of nineteen kilometers.37 Terminal guidance of an ASBM would appear
to be a feasible adaptation of missile systems with which China has had success (surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, and antiship cruise missiles).38 Still,
a number of unique technical obstacles remain, such as the materials needed to
protect sophisticated guidance systems during reentry; 39 the ability to function
in an environment of higher speed and more severe temperature dynamics than
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in earlier applications; 40 and the ability to distinguish a target at unusual angles
of attack at the distances required for reentry.41
A number of publications view U.S. missile defenses as a primary concern
for the ASBM in its terminal phase as well as midcourse. Some believe that the
ASBM will have to slow down considerably in order to locate and maneuver to
the carrier, making it a much more manageable problem for missile defenses.42
Others see the difficulties in fending off electronic jamming and measures
against active-radar terminal seekers.
In sum, in the available literature on the ASBM that began to proliferate in
the late 1990s, one can see the rough outline of a technical evolution. Discussions are now less theoretical and conceptual in nature and are instead more
systematic and detailed. Earlier studies were broader in scope, addressing large
portions of the kill chain, from launch to target impact.43 Since then, studies
have become increasingly specific, focusing on particular engineering problems,
within limited ranges of analysis.44 Further, some earlier studies laid out conceptual proposals that contained glaring technical inconsistencies; later documents have been more concerned with applications and have been underpinned
by carefully scrutinized simulations.45 Finally, in later publications one can read
of specific research and testing being done on component technologies. For instance, early experiments on high-altitude gliding of the missile frame appear to
have begun.46 Likewise, testing on “active radar guided weapon systems aimed
at maritime targets” has been conducted, although not “under heavy sea conditions and a small grazing angle,” as the authors admit would be necessary to an
operational evaluation.47 Notwithstanding, if these examples may illustrate a
concrete progression in core components of the ASBM system, they also reveal
that work on the many secondary technical issues is just beginning. In addition,
it has been clearly realized that theory and even testing are not substitutes for
combat experience, of which China has none in this realm.48
Missing Links
To strike any target with an ASBM, China would have first to form an accurate
idea of its recent location. In the kill-chain formulation, this would comprise
detecting, identifying, tracking, targeting, and engaging the threat. The Chinese
literature on this aspect of the ASBM system is generally pessimistic that the
PLA has enough of the key technologies to realize such a system.
Detecting the carrier at great distances would depend on early-warning systems, such as sky-wave, over-the-horizon (OTH) radar, or electronic signals intelligence, that would give a general idea of the target’s geographic coordinates.49
There is substantial evidence that China has at least one over-the-horizonbackscatter (OTH-B) system up and running.50 It could be used to identify
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targets at long range, although with a tracking error of from twenty to forty
kilometers (substantially lower than the American OTH accuracy, roughly eight
to thirty kilometers) it would be unable to perform reliable target location independently.51 An ASBM attack radius of roughly twenty kilometers, as discussed
above, would correlate only to the extreme, best-possible performance of China’s OTH tracking, and even then only for a stationary carrier. Long-distance
early warning could also come from electronic and signal intelligence (ELINT
and SIGINT), whether airborne, shipborne, or space based. China’s ability to
use airborne and shipborne electronic surveillance would be limited, however,
since both would require a dangerously close approach to the carrier group. The
open-source literature is almost completely silent on China’s current on-orbit
ELINT/SIGINT assets, but indirect evidence indicates that it either does have
such capabilities or is actively developing them.52
Once the carrier is identified, its position needs to be pinpointed. Long-range
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) could gather such information. China is apparently committed to investing in such a program and has several operational
high- and medium-altitude long-endurance UAVs, with others planned, capable
of carrying out reconnaissance far out at sea. The Xianglong, currently China’s
largest UAV, appears to have a combat radius of 2,000–2,500 kilometers (that
is, a range of 7,500 kilometers), a mission payload of six hundred kilograms,
and a maximum endurance of ten hours.53 It can also carry electronic jamming
pods to defend against antiradiation missiles, as well Global Positioning System
jamming and antijamming capabilities. However, the Xianglong is believed still
to lack sufficient high-altitude endurance for an anticarrier mission. Moreover,
China still lacks C4ISR infrastructure—such as information processing, bandwidth capacity, and network support—needed for wide-area surveillance at the
level of the U.S. Broad Area Maritime System.54 Further, even a fully capable
UAV could be vulnerable to a carrier group’s formidable air and electronic defenses—assuming the carrier(s) and accompanying ships were not operating in
electronic silence in order not to announce their approach—before it could provide targeting information; thus the UAV alone is not a reliable option.55 Theoretically, if advanced enough, UAV capabilities would be adequate for targeting
if combined with other terrestrial cueing systems, such as OTH. However, the
open-source literature clearly views these capabilities as currently insufficient to
deal with superior U.S. naval power.
Overall, China’s current UAV capabilities and the risks involved in obtaining targeting information from surface combatant vessels or air forces near the
CSG strongly suggest that the PLA would not depend solely upon these platforms to determine the exact location of the target. Others have surmised that
the Chinese military could utilize such alternatives as China’s growing fleet of
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stealthy submarines, or even merchant fishing vessels, to supply targeting data.56
For example, the PLA Navy submarine force, with its increasing number of quiet
attack submarines, offers another conceivable alternative for tracking targets
at sea. These are not optimal means, but they are immediately available and
could be part of an interim capability or emergency backup. To what degree
these methods would be relied on in a time of conflict is debatable; 57 a robust
and reliable targeting system to support the ASBM, of which space-based reconnaissance would be a key element, appears to be a high priority.58 Regardless,
and given the widespread assumption that space-based targeting is critical, does
China have enough of the right type of satellites to find a carrier and view it frequently enough to be sure of its location, and if so, can it process and transmit
the data to the launch pad quickly enough?
Space-Based Targeting
The literature reveals a consensus that a space-based reconnaissance system,
though critical to the effective operation of conventional missiles, remains
the weakest link in China’s targeting capabilities.59 Two areas of concern are
prevalent. The first involves the physical limitations of China’s current space
infrastructure for reconnaissance. While many Chinese satellites have sufficient
imaging resolution (given the size of the target and its radar cross section, resolution demands are not high), the systemwide revisit rate is inadequate for sustained coverage.60 Other articles show a lack of confidence in China’s ability to
locate moving targets using imaging satellites, arguing the need for electronic
surveillance satellites to augment them.61 But the problem is more than quantity, as others argue: fitting the various components of C4ISR into a seamless network remains a huge challenge for China.62 This last issue involves technological
system limitations, but it also entails organizational and bureaucratic barriers
impeding the ability of disparate space assets to perform highly time-sensitive
missions.63 In short, the literature strongly indicates that space infrastructure
for the ASBM targeting likely remains underdeveloped.64
China has a maximum of twenty-two imaging space assets that could potentially assist in identifying, locating, and tracking a carrier group. Only nine of
the imaging satellites in low earth orbit (LEO) are classified as military; however, given the dual-use nature of many of the civilian space assets, the possibility
that other nominally nonmilitary satellites could be tasked in a time of conflict
cannot be discounted. The lingering question is how well all of these space assets can be integrated, both within the military and across the civilian/military
divide. Assuming the best, what time lag would occur in the processing of this
imagery? While the degree of integration of China’s various dual-use assets is
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impossible to assess quantitatively and precisely from public sources, a number
of reported characteristics demonstrate that it is certainly not seamless.
Institutional barriers are frequently identified as a potential obstacle to integrating the diverse ownership and operating arrangements of China’s space assets. This could be particularly acute in applying space assets to a time-sensitive
mission, such as C4ISR support for an ASBM strike on a U.S. carrier, that would
require a closely coordinated space architecture.
For instance, how would the two services critical to executing an ASBM mission—the Second Artillery and the PLA Navy (PLAN)—fit into the military aerospace sector, which would provide critical support?65 This issue is compounded
by the fact that command and control over China’s military space capabilities is
itself not unified. Nor are the lines of authority clear between the military and
China’s unique and diverse civilian and government space organization, a fact
that would have an impact both on the use of space assets and on the real-time
exchange of data across a large, interagency information network.66
China’s satellite program is highly decentralized. The PLA unquestionably
plays the most prominent role in overseeing China’s dual-use space infrastructure; however, many satellites and their application are owned or operated by at
FIGURE 3
CHINESE SPACE ORGANIZATION
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FIGURE 3 CONTINUED
CHINESE SPACE ORGANIZATION

CMC: Central Military Commission
GPD: General Politics Department
GSD: General Staff Department
GAD: General Armaments Department
PLAN: PLA Navy
PLAAF: PLA Air Force
MND: Ministry of National Defense
MOE: Ministry of Education
BOSTIND: Bureau of Science & Technology Industry for National Defense
MII: Ministry of Industry and Information

CASC: China Aeronautics Science and Technology Corporation
CAST: China Academy of Space Technology
CMA: China Meteorological Agency
SOA: State Oceanographic Agency
NCDR: National Committee for Disaster Reductions
MLR: Ministry for Land and Resources
S&T Min: Science and Technology Ministry
SBSM: State Bureau for Surveying & Mapping
NRSC: National Remote Sensing Center
CAS: China Academy of Sciences

least a dozen agencies spread across the government, universities, and the quasiprivate sector—in addition to the military.
The primary authority over launch facilities and on-orbit command and control is the General Armaments Department (GAD), while the overall military
operation of satellites is the purview of various departments within the General
Staff Department (GSD). Furthermore, approximately 75 percent of China’s
space-based assets are essentially under nonmilitary entities, such as the China
Meteorological Agency, the State Oceanographic Agency, and a number of stateowned enterprises. These are peacetime operators, and the transfer of authority
and expertise to the PLA during a time of conflict is cited as a concern among
some in the military.67
Achieving commonality would require bridging between essentially coequal
military bureaucracies (such as GAD and GSD) and different levels of military
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bodies (GAD and the Second Artillery, the PLA Air Force, the PLAN, and the
seven military regions), as well as between military and nonmilitary agencies
(e.g., the PLAN and the State Oceanographic Agency).68 In short, integration
of the command and application of on-orbit assets would entail coordination
horizontally and vertically within the military as well as across military and
civilian organizations. In theory, the overall control the military has over the
space program, combined with the improved and soon to be promulgated National Defense and Mobilization Law, will likely provide sufficient authority to
coordinate command and control over space during a conflict.69 Nevertheless,
limiting the transaction cost in working with so many agencies could be critical
in such time-sensitive demands as an ASBM combat mission. Since the military is deeply involved in the space program, lines of authority may be clearer
than is apparent from open-source evidence, yet the increasingly vociferous
calls for a more coherent space leadership and legal guarantees applying to time
of conflict signal a lack of integration.70 The initial confusion over organizing
remote-sensing data from domestic and foreign sources during the Wenchuan
earthquake is, if nothing else, testimony to the difficulties inherent in such a
system.71
Moreover, the command structure remains vague within the military itself.
To take an operational example, the plausible use of space for an ASBM mission
would require at a minimum a highly coordinated effort between satellite space
support, missile launch operators, and the navy. No independent PLA organization exists to ensure this, although several services are vying for organizational
leadership of the military space program, including the air force, GAD, GSD,
and the Second Artillery.72
MODELING: CHINA’S SPACE ISR FOR TARGETING
Assuming that China’s space assets were sufficiently integrated to support an
ASBM mission during a conflict, the question remains as to whether the sum
of all its satellite capabilities would be large enough to succeed. To be confident
that it can launch an attack on a carrier group at a time of its choosing, China
would need to update the group’s location as often as possible.73 Its ability to do
this would depend on the orbits of its satellites and the capabilities of the sensors
each carries.74
The frequency with which an individual satellite revisits a location depends
on both its orbit and the maneuverability of its sensors. In the low latitudes
where a Taiwan-related conflict would occur, it could take between five and
twenty-nine days for one of China’s reconnaissance satellites to pass directly
over the same point twice. However, by pointing its cameras or sensors sideways—that is, aiming “off nadir,” not only straight down—a satellite can image
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from adjacent passes, greatly increasing the revisit rate. The modeling below
uses two sets of off-nadir angles to provide both average or realistic, as well as
maximum, scenarios.75
In the task of finding a U.S. carrier at sea, China’s satellites would vary in their
usefulness according to sensor type and resolution. Of the sensors deployed on
China’s satellites, synthetic aperture radar (SAR) is the most useful for hunting
maritime targets, as it can sweep a relatively wide swath at a resolution good
enough to image fairly small targets.76 SAR can produce imagery regardless of
weather or sunlight. Instead of merely looking for a carrier group itself, SAR can
capture ship wakes trailing over large stretches of ocean, making it particularly
useful for finding moving targets. Multispectral and hyperspectral sensors can
also be very effective. For instance, they could spot algae and other phosphorescent material churned up by ships. Infrared and regular visible-light images
could also be useful, but they would have relatively narrow foci and could not
scan vast stretches of ocean.
Like most aspects of the military space program, the exact sensor capabilities
of China’s satellites are closely guarded secrets. However, general sensor information is available for most satellites (see the table). According to open sources,
only four of China’s satellites in low earth orbit, all in the military Yaogan series, are equipped with SAR. Other satellites, nominally intended for weather
monitoring, survey, or other civilian uses, could potentially be of use during a
conflict. Satellites like the CBERS, Haiyang, Fengyun, and Huanjing types carry
multi- and hyperspectral sensors that could be used to locate military targets.
CHINESE SATELLITE IMAGING CAPABILITIES
Satellite

Sensor Capabilities

Ziyuan-2A

Charge-coupled device (CCD); infrared multispectral scanner; capable of
generating high-quality (< 3 m resolution)

Jianbing-3B (Ziyuan-2B)

High-resolution CCD camera; infrared multispectral scanner

Jianbing-3C (Ziyuan-2C)

High-resolution CCD cameras; infrared multispectral scanner

Yaogan-1

SAR (5 m resolution, high resolution: 5 × 5 m target discrimination at 40 km,
low resolution: 20 m × 20 m at 100 km)

Yaogan-2

Electro-optical; multispectral sensors (1 m resolution)

Yaogan-3

SAR (high resolution: < 5 × 5 m)

Yaogan-4

Electro-optical (0.5 m resolution)

Yaogan-5

SAR

Yaogan-6

SAR (estimated ground resolution of 0.6–1 m)

Tansuo-1 (Shiyan-1)

High-resolution electro-optical; near infrared; CCD survey cameras (10 m
resolution; image swath of 120 km wide)

Tansuo-2 (Shiyan-2)

Electro-optical

Shiyan-3

Electro-optical
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CHINESE SATELLITE IMAGING CAPABILITIES CONTINUED
Satellite

Sensor Capabilities

Haiyang-1B

Chinese Ocean Color and Thermal Scanner; pixel resolution: 1.1 km (nadir);
the swath width is ~1,600 km; field of vision (swath pixels per scan line ±55
degrees at 2,800 km); focal length of optical system: 650 mm for visible near
infrared, 190 mm for thermal infrared; telescope aperture diameter 200 mm

CBERS-1

Wide Field Imager camera (spatial resolution: 260 km; ground swath 890 km);
CCD (spatial resolution: 20 m; swath width: 113 km); infrared multispectral
scanner (resolution: 80 m); thermal channel: 160 m; swath width: 120 km; offnadir capability of ±32 degrees

CBERS-2

Wide Field Imager camera (spatial resolution: 260 km; ground swath 890 km);
CCD (spatial resolution: 20 m; swath: 113 km); infrared multispectral scanner
(resolution: 80 m); thermal channel: 160 m; swath width: 120 km; off-nadir
capability of ±32 degrees

CBERS-2B

Wide Field Imager camera (spatial resolution: 260 km; ground swath 890 km);
CCD (spatial resolution: 20 m; swath width: 113 km); high-resolution camera
(resolution: 2.7 m; swath width: 27 km); also near-infrared bands

Huanjing-1A

Multispectral CCD camera (resolution: 30 m; swath 700 km with two cameras);
infrared sensors (30 m spatial resolution), real-time imaging; optical

Huanjing-1B

Hyperspectral; infrared (30 m spatial resolution); real-time imaging; optical
sensor

Fengyun-1D

Visible, infrared, and microwave

Fengyun-3A

Spatial resolution of 250 m; 10-channel visible and infrared radiometer (VIRR);
moderate resolution visible and infrared imager (MODI); microwave radiation
imager (MWRI), measures thermal microwave emissions using six frequency
points in dual polarizations; infrared atmospheric sounder (IRAS)

Chuangxin (CX-102)

Microsatellite; electro-optical

Beijing-1 (Tsinghua)

Panchromatic image (4 m resolution); multispectral images (32 m resolution);
infrared band wavelength (774 nm to 900 nm)

Simulation
In the lead-up to an ASBM launch, how good would China’s view from space
be? Our simulation of the satellite ground tracks and revisit rates of China’s
imaging satellites (nine military and thirteen civilian) shows that even in a bestcase scenario, coverage is intermittent and punctuated by long blackouts during which no imagery can be obtained.77 Counting all twenty-two satellites and
assuming the widest field of view (that is, up to sixty degrees off nadir), the
average time between revisits is forty-five minutes, with fourteen passes over
the selected target areas each day—but with nine gaps in coverage of two hours
or longer. The worst-case scenario, counting only military-designated satellites
and imaging a conservative field of view (thirty degrees off nadir or less), gives
an average of eight passes per day. In both scenarios, however, coverage is not
evenly distributed, with large gaps of five and a half to ten hours, depending on
field of view.78 Overall, China was “in the dark” for sixty-nine of the seventy-two
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hours simulated. Still, between the long gaps there were several notable clusters
of satellite passes in which frequent imagery could be gathered.79 The most optimistic list of all China’s imaging satellites yields three notable periods in which
up to eight satellites make passes within an hour and a half. These few instances
of relative operational clarity would be good opportunities for launch, but the
U.S. Navy would no doubt be conscious of these fleeting moments and plan its
maneuvers and defenses accordingly.
FIGURE 4
SATELLITE SIMULATION (DAY 1)

Filling the Gaps
In their regular orbits, China’s satellites do not appear capable of gathering timely, on-demand data for targeting; however, in a time of conflict China would
employ several measures to boost coverage. First, it would shift satellites into
more advantageous orbits to gain imagery sooner and more often than their
regular orbits would allow. But altering orbits is no easy feat, and each move
requires intensive planning and calculation. We did not model the numerous
potential rearrangements for this article; however, useful comparisons can be
derived from other technical studies. Some analyses, restricting fuel expenditures to a reasonable amount, have illustrated that the average time between
revisits of a designated location can be decreased by 36.4 percent.80 While the
fuel capacities of China’s military-designated satellites are likely large enough to
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allow more fuel for orbital shifts, it should be remembered that because a CSG
is not a stationary point, orbits would have to be continually changed, in accordance with its suspected location.
China could also plug holes in its coverage by launching microsatellites.81
These could be technologically similar to the Huanjing or Haiyang series, which
are effective for maritime reconnaissance and are small enough to launch relatively quickly with small rockets.82 However, microsatellites come with significant trade-offs. Their small size and power reserves are not well suited to large,
electricity-hungry radar systems, and their downlink capabilities are restricted
by small antennas and limited fields of view.83 Some of these challenges may be
surmountable, with several studies suggesting that networked constellations or
special antennas could improve microsatellite performance.84 China’s exact capabilities in these areas are not publicly known, but suffice it to say that the PLA
will face major technological obstacles to integrating microsatellites seamlessly
into its larger C4ISR picture.
China would also face challenges in putting microsatellites into orbit. Smaller solid-fuel rocket systems such as the Kaituozhe (Pioneer) are likely under
development; 85 nonetheless, the ability to launch “responsively” and in larger
numbers is often cited by Chinese strategists as a bottleneck problem for China’s military space program, due to limitations in fi xed launch sites as well
as telemetry, tracking, and control (TTC) stations.86 TTC stations and launch
facilities are also seen as highly vulnerable to attack. Nevertheless, the ability to
quickly put small satellites into low earth orbit using small, solid-fuel rockets
provides significant opportunities to reduce vulnerability. As for the difficulties in simultaneously launching larger numbers of satellites, during the last
several years China has increased its number of satellite launches in short windows of time, with a peak of seven during a four-month period in 2004, demonstrating an ability to maintain a higher tempo of satellite launches and TTC
activity.87 In addition, the construction of the space launch facility in Hainan
Island would increase China’s overall launch and TTC capability.88
Long-Term Plans
In the Haiyang and Huanjing series alone, China could launch within the next
five years between eight and twelve new-generation satellites that would be capable of maritime surveillance, and eight to twelve more in the five years thereafter. These are tentative estimates, but they are also only the plans currently
made public (posted as Table A-1 at the end). Moreover, these estimates do not
include satellites launched for dedicated military use, such as the Ziyuan or Yaogan series. Information on those programs is far less clear, but extrapolating
from their rates of launch over the past few years, on-orbit assets of these types
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could increase from their current nine to more than fifteen within a five-year
period. The steady progress in the satellite sensor technology and the emphasis placed on remote-sensing technology overall in the last two five-year plans
and the space white papers suggest little reason to doubt that recent trends will
continue. In theory, the remote-sensing capabilities needed for near-continuous
coverage within the Asia-Pacific region could be achieved within five years and
a broader, continuous global coverage within ten years. How much these additional satellites will improve China’s ability to pinpoint targets at sea will depend
on the degree to which they are optimized for such a mission. However, China’s
space program is highly “dual use” in nature, run by numerous agencies, and
applied to many missions, both military and civilian; thus, specific analysis of
its development is crucial.
Measuring Up
The most obvious benchmark for China’s space reconnaissance programs is
parity with those of the United States. Judging from publicly available data, the
United States has roughly fourteen LEO satellites dedicated to providing imagery.89 While U.S. reconnaissance satellites are technically advanced, the system’s
temporal resolution is not dramatically better than that of China. Where the
United States definitively leads China is in the area of data processing and integration. Perhaps the most important aspect of the American space reconnaissance system is its ability to pool imagery from a variety of military, civilian, and
commercial services and distribute it in a timely fashion. Within five minutes of
its capture by a satellite, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency can begin
analyzing an image and can then transmit it to field commanders within seconds.90 Reports from 2003 operations in Iraq put the time from target identification to strike at less than fifteen minutes.91 This speed depends on an intricate
web of data-relay satellites, such as the Milstar, TDRSS, and NAVSTAR systems,
the equivalents of which China does not yet possess.
At present, neither country has the capability to watch a target continuously
from space, even in a regional conflict. The United States has put forward plans
to build space-based radar and imaging systems that approach global, nearcontinuous coverage, but the two proposed projects have encountered funding
disagreements and exceeded budgets.92 Both projects are currently stalled, and
their futures remain uncertain.
Most useful to China, particularly in the context of acquiring targets for an
ASBM, would be capabilities similar to the Discoverer II project, such as satellites equipped with both SAR and the Ground Moving Target Indicator system
(which uses Doppler pulses to locate moving objects in a wide field of view, making it particularly useful for watching ocean traffic).93 However, while China
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would not need the full constellation of twenty-four satellites proposed in the
U.S. system to support a regional conflict, the cost would still be prohibitive.
Including the extensive complementary ground systems required, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office estimated the total cost of the Starlite/Discoverer II
project to be between $25 and $90 billion.94 However, if the PLA intends to deter
the U.S. Navy credibly with conventional missile programs, China may indeed
need to make extravagant expenditures in space. The American military’s dependence on satellite imagery is tempered by a highly developed UAV program
and overwhelming air superiority, but China presently lacks such advantages.
BEYOND AN ANTISHIP BALLISTIC MISSILE
Is China developing an antiship ballistic missile? The literature is fairly conclusive that China’s military is keenly interested in the system and could leverage a number of off-the-shelf technologies, particularly with regard to the
DF-21 missile system itself, in developing one. However, the theoretical and
less-than-systematic nature of technical studies indicates that the research and,
in some cases, testing of component technologies remain in their early phases.
Furthermore, a fully operational and effective ASBM is a complex system that
requires a network of ground, air, sea, electronic, and information infrastructures, most of which lag far behind the missile technology itself. Among these,
a key underdeveloped system is precision targeting of a maneuverable object at
long range, particularly the space-based segment. Real-time, continuous coverage of the maritime regions where China would most likely engage a U.S. carrier
strike group would require a far better developed early-warning, imaging, and
communication space architecture, along with more ground support, than it
currently has. China’s imaging capability alone remains far from sufficient to
provide the high revisit rates needed for an effective ASBM capability. There
are remedial short-term options, such as rapid launch of additional satellites or
use of the full suite of civilian and government satellites, but all have strategic
drawbacks for China.
The most immediate obstacle to utilizing China’s full spectrum of space assets
lies in the fact that this is a highly dual-use area. Interservice and interagency
cooperation, particularly coordination in the areas of technology development,
data sharing, command, and future investment in on-orbit assets, all raise thorny
problems for application to a specific military mission.95 The example of Beidou
and the long development process that has plagued it testifies to the difficulties
inherent in an expensive and complex dual-use project.96 For these and many
other reasons, these critical components of space-based support will collectively represent a difficult and slow sector in the development of a battle-ready
ASBM. In fact, much of the thinking on how to accomplish this has only just
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begun. Yet in an optimistic estimate based on China’s current trajectory of military space asset programs, as well as its overall plans for a variety of imaging
and communication satellites, a system competent to provide near-real-time
regional coverage could be five years away, while global coverage could be attainable within ten years.
Most of the attention in military circles has been narrowly focused on China’s
ASBM. But what are the broader implications of this “system of systems” for
China’s military modernization? If China eventually acquires a complete targeting network to complement an ASBM capability, the Chinese military could
conceivably adapt the system to other launch platforms (e.g., ships), other missiles (short-range or intercontinental ballistic missiles), or relevant technologies
(missile defense). The parallels with the conventionalization of U.S. strategic
weapons (“global strike”) become unavoidable.97 While it is merely conjecture,
one could infer—from the advances made in China’s short-range ballistic missile numbers and capabilities facing Taiwan, in addition to ASBM and even
antisatellite testing—an emerging PLA strategy aimed more at missile-based,
asymmetrical deterrence than parity in hardware. Do these trends point to a
growing missile-centric PLA doctrine? Perhaps, but there are just as many voices clamoring for a strategy of mimicking American weapons platforms (such
as an aircraft carrier) as there are proponents of a greater reliance on deterrent,
asymmetrical systems.
While an operational ASBM may be some time away, the impact of such a
system on the stability of U.S.-China strategic relations and on the region would
be substantial. Short of using it in a conflict—a scenario nearly impossible to
imagine—a number of questions arise regarding the effect an ASBM capability
might have on both Chinese and American behavior. How would an ASBM alter
China’s perception of its strategic environment? Would an operational ASBM
merely provide greater assurance against American intervention in a Taiwan
conflict, or would it embolden Beijing to act more aggressively? What about China’s deterrent posture, which it consistently frames as solely defensive? It is in
this sense that Chinese and American perspectives perhaps clash the most. China argues that intent, not merely capabilities, decides behavior.98 China would
thus contend that an additional weapon capability will not influence its future
actions. The United States would hold that capability is far more important to
influencing behavior and that a better-armed China might pursue objectives it
otherwise would not. For nuclear weapons, with an extremely high threshold
for use, the Chinese position has been tenable and believable. However, conventional weapons lower the threshold for use, and crossing that threshold is easier
to imagine.
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Furthermore, the deployment of antiship ballistic missiles would logically
seem to blur the lines between offensive and defensive strategy.99 The most effective use of the ASBM would be a strike on a carrier strike group at long range
as it steams toward waters east of the Taiwan Strait, before its cruise missiles
and air-strike capability could be employed. Once the CSG came close enough
to launch strikes, the asymmetric advantage of the ASBM would be limited. In
other words, China might have to decide whether to strike first, perhaps even
preemptively. This could greatly impact crisis stability in a confrontation between China and the United States, as well as influence longer-term competition. The dangers of escalation would be grave, since the United States would
need to consider China’s options and respond accordingly. Over the longer term,
an arms race is a very real possibility: the United States, which still holds a significant lead in naval power and most military technologies, would not sit still
while China developed the ASBM.
The advent of an ASBM would be more than an incremental advance in
weaponry; it could be a strategic “game changer,” as others have dubbed it.100
Accordingly, the impact an ASBM capability will have on security perceptions,
deterrence strategies, and escalatory control point to the need for a much more
intensive and sustained military-to-military dialogue than is currently under
way. As yet another sign of China’s growing might, the missile would be an
important, singular development in the continuing shift away from U.S. strategic dominance in the western Pacific. Such a transformation would not go
uncontested, and will bring a number of risks that could draw the two sides
into heightened competition and even conflict. But there will also be repeated
opportunities to stave off military competition in favor of mutual accommodation and a cooperative regional approach. This process is dependent on building trust through transparency, as each side becomes more confident about the
other’s capabilities and intents and as facts, not fears, can inform the actions and
responses of decision makers on both sides.
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blurring the lines between conventional
and nuclear attacks. For instance, could a
conventional ASBM headed for an aircraft
carrier be mistaken for a nuclear attack
or an electromagnetic-pulse detonation?
What would be the response? In fact, this is
highly reminiscent of the contention over
the Pentagon proposal mentioned above to
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use the Trident missile as a conventional
weapon. The dual use of strategic ballistic
missiles to carry both nuclear and conventional warheads, with their short kill chains
and decision-making cycles, has profound
implications for escalation control.
100. Andrew Erickson and David Yang, “On
the Verge of a Game-Changer,” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings (May 2009).
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A-1

TABLE A-1
CHINA’S FUTURE SATELLITE PLANS (5–10 YEARS)
Series of Sats

Name

Purpose

Ocean Color &
SST

HY-1

China Ocean
Observation
Satellitesa

China’s
Environmental
and Disaster
Monitoring Satellite System
Compass
Navigation
Satellite Systemf

Fengyun
Meteorological
Satellitesh

Capability/Characteristics

8

HY-1C/D (2010)
HY-1E/F (2013)
HY-1G/H (2016)
HY-1I/J (2019)

4

HY-2A (2010)
HY-2B (2013)
HY-2C (2016)
HY-2D (2019)

Dual frequency (Ku, C) radar
altimeter and tri-frequency
radiometer, Ku Band scan
radar scatterometer, microwave
imager, 3-year lifespan
SAR sensor, 1–10 m resolution,
X-band, real time or delay,
400GB data storage, three-axis
stably, 3-year lifetime
S-band SAR, 5–20 m resolution

Optical radiometer to detect ocean color and surface
temperature, medium spatial
resolution optical sensor for
observing ocean color

Ocean Dynamicsb

HY-3

Marine Monitoring
Satellitec

3

2012
2017
2022

HJ1-Cd

Remote Sensing

1

2009

HJ2e

Remote Sensing

8

Uncertain

BeiDou
2/M

Navigation/Global
Positioning

12

2009–2011

20

Before 2020

1

2010

CBERS-04

1

2013

FY-2 F/G

2

2010
2012

FY-3 seriesi

10

2009–2019j

Microwave sensors,
MWTS, 50–75 km resolution
MWHS, 15 km resolution
MWRI, 15–70km resolution

2013–2020l

Optical version (FY-4O) and
microwave (FY-4M); microwave sensor with real aperture
antenna and synthetic aperture
technique

Before 2020

Based on the DFH-4 satellite
bus, the two satellites will be
able to cover around 85 percent
of the spacecraft’s trajectory

Remote Sensing

Earth Science

FY-4
seriesk

Tracking and
Data Relay
Satellitesm

Launch Time

HY-2

CBERS-03
Earth Resource
Satellitesg

# Sats

TL-2

n

7

Data Relay
Communications
Satellite

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss4/7

1

4 optical satellites, 4 SAR
satellites
China and East Asia before
2011, and then will be a global
system in 2020
CCD Cameras including PAN,
MUX, IRS, and WFI, 5–10 m
resolution
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A-2

TABLE A-1 CONTINUED
CHINA’S FUTURE SATELLITE PLANS (5–10 YEARS)
Series of Sats

Name

# Sats

Launch Time

SinoSat
4/5/6p

3

2009–2011

ChinaStar-2

1

Unsure

1

2009

Telecom
Satelliteso

Purpose

Communications

AsiaSat-5q

Capability/Characteristics
Sinosat-4, hybrid communications payload, 24 C-band, 8
Ku-band, and 1 S-band active
transponders; Sinosat-5, DFH-4
platform, 15-year design lifetime;
Sinosat-6, DFH-4 bus, a hybrid
communications payload made
up of 24 C-band, 8 Ku-band, and
1 S-band active transponders

Based on SS/L’s LS-1300
platform, C- and Ku-band transponders, a 15-year mission life.

Notes:
a. wgcv.ceos.org/docs/plenary/wgcv28/2_OceanObservations_of_China_Jiang_b.pdf; www.aviso.oceanobs.com/en/missions/future-missions/hy-2/index.html; www.
soa.gov.cn/hyjww/ml/wx/A025007index_1.htm, Sun Zhihui, Director of SOA, “Review of China‘s Ocean Satellites over the Past Two Decades,” published in
website of SOA, 12 April 2007 [孙志辉,国家海洋局局长, “团结奋进 再创辉煌-中国海洋卫星事业发展20年回顾”], www.moc.gov.cn/06hanghairi/hanghaizt/
hanghaidsj/200704/t20070412_217447.htm; and Bai Zhaoguang and Li Yifan,“Achievements and Prospect of China Ocean Satellite Technology,” Spacecraft
Engineering, no. 4 (2008). The Haiyang-3 series will be equipped with SAR, all-weather, day and night coverage and far greater resolution. This will provide China
with far greater ship detection capabilities. However, the Haiyang-3 series is currently only in preliminary stages of R&D and there is no timeline yet for its launch.
China National Space Agency, “The Development of China’s Ocean Satellites” [国家航天局,中国海洋卫星的应用与发展], available at www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615708/
n676979/n2234896/n2234901/167394.html.
b. The objective of HY-2 is monitor the dynamic ocean environment with microwave sensors to detect sea surface wind field, sea surface height, and sea surface
temperature. It will include an altimeter dual-frequency in Ku- and C-bands, a scatterometer, and a microwave imager.
c. To provide services to safeguard the state’s maritime rights and interests, marine law enforcement, rapid response to national security, marine environmental
protection, monitoring of marine pollution, exploitation of marine resources, coastal zones survey, management of marine resources, polar study and research,
etc.
d. www.cresda.com.cn/cn/News/News.asp?id=344.
e. wgcv.ceos.org/docs/plenary/wgcv28/1_China%27s_EOS_Jiang_b.pdf.
f. It will be built as an area guidance system covering China and East Asia before 2011, and then will be a global system in 2020. www.huaxia.com/xw/
gdxw/2008/11/1215990.html, www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615708/n620172/n677078/n751578/74551.html.
g. www.cresda.com.cn/cn/products.htm.
h. wgcv.ceos.org/documentation/wgcv28.htm, www.nsmc.cma.gov.cn.
i. FY-3 series is an improved generation of polar-orbiting heliosynchronous weather satellites with microwave sensors. See wgcv.ceos.org/docs/plenary/wgcv28/
CMA_ZHANG_b.pdf.
j. FY-3B (test), 2009; FY-3AM1, 2011; FY-3PM1, 2012; FY-3RM (test), 2013; FY-3AM2, 2014; FY-3PM2, 2015; FY-3RM1, 2016; FY-3AM3, 2017; FY-3PM3, 2018;
FY-3RM, 2019; see wgcv.ceos.org/docs/plenary/wgcv28/CMA_ZHANG_b.pdf.
k. FY-4 series is an improved generation of geosynchronous meteorological satellites with optical version (FY-4O) and microwave (FY-4M) satellite; see wgcv.ceos
.org/docs/plenary/wgcv28/CMA_ZHANG_b.pdf.
l. FY-4A (test), 2013; FY-4EAST1, 2015; FY-4WEST1, 2016; FY-4MS (test), 2017; FY-4EAST2, 2019; FY-4WEST2, 2020; FY-4MS, 2020; see wgcv.ceos.org/docs/
plenary/wgcv28/CMA_ZHANG_b.pdf.
m. The TDRSS (Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System) is a system that can supply the data relay and TTC (telemetry, tracking, and control) service for the aircraft
that are in low and middle earth orbit and other aircrafts, and aircraft and earth stations. Ye Peijian, “Outlook of China’s Aircraft and Moon Exploration in 2020,”
Academic Reports published in CAS Academic Conference, 2000 [叶培建, “2020年我国航天器展望和月球探测工程,” 2000年中国科学院院士大会学术报告],
available at it.sohu.com/20050311/n224639960.shtml.
n. Based on the DFH-4 satellite bus, the two satellites will be able to cover around 85 percent of the spacecraft’s trajectory, compared to 50 percent that was previously covered by Tian Lian-1. “Space Second Transmitter: Description of Satellite Data System,” BBS of cjdby.net, available at bbs.cjdby.net/viewthread
.php?tid=211901.
o. SINOSAT-4 satellite is hybrid communications payload made up of 24 C-band, 8 Ku-band, and 1 S-band active transponders. See www.chinadbsat.com.cn/
satellite.asp?theName=%D6%D0%CE%C01%BA%C5&id=1.
p. The satellite will be based on SS/L‘s LS-1300 platform, which features qualified, flight-proven subsystems and a long record of reliable operation. The satellite’s
payload will carry both C- and Ku-band transponders and has a fifteen-year mission life. See www.chinadbsat.com.cn/satellite.asp?theName=%D6%D0%CE
%C01%BA%C5&id=1. Sinosat-5 is a communications satellite to be based upon a DFH-4 platform. The spacecraft will feature a fifteen-year design lifetime and
a 5000-kg launch. Sinosat-6 is based upon a DFH-4 bus and will embark a hybrid communications payload made up of 24 C-band, 8 Ku-band, and 1 S-band
active transponders. See www.chinadbsat.com.cn/satellite.asp?theName=%D6%D0%CE%C01%BA%C5&id=1.
q. The satellite will be based on SS/L’s LS-1300 platform, which features qualified, flight-proven subsystems and a long record of reliable operation. The satellite’s
payload will carry both C- and Ku-band transponders and has a fifteen-year mission life. See www.chinadbsat.com.cn/satellite.asp?theName=%D6%D0%CE%
C01%BA%C5&id=1.
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